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A B S T R A C T
This paper considers the impact of non-founder human capital on high-tech ﬁrms' long-run growth and
survival. Drawing upon threshold theory, we explore how lack of access to complementary skills at diﬀerent
points in the life course impacts founders' thresholds for exit. We examine these factors using a unique
longitudinal dataset tracking the performance and survival of a sample of UK high-tech ﬁrms over thirteen years
as the ﬁrms move from youth into maturity. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that survive but do not grow are characterized by
diﬃculty in accessing complementary managerial skills in youth, while ﬁrms that grow but subsequently exit are
characterized by shortfalls of specialized complementary skills during adolescence. Firms that grow and survive
do not report skills shortfalls. We discuss the implications of these resource constraints for entrepreneurs’
decisions to persist or exit through the life course.
1. Introduction and key literature
There is a sizeable body of literature on human capital in high-tech
ﬁrms (Westhead and Cowling, 1995; Aspelund et al., 2005; Colombo
and Grilli 2005, 2010; Ganotakis 2012; Delgado-Verde et al., 2016)
but, in line with the widely prevalent ‘upper echelon’ theory (Hambrick
and Mason, 1984), nearly all of this literature has focused on the role of
founders, CEOs or top management teams. This paper draws from a
diﬀuse but growing body of research on the role of non-founder human
capital (Smith et al., 2005; Klaas et al., 2010; De Winne and Sels, 2010
; Andries and Czarnitzki, 2014). While founders are clearly important,
this paper aims to provide a counterpoint to ‘upper echelon’ ap-
proaches by arguing that the ability to access these workforce skills
plays a crucial role in shaping the growth and survival prospects of a
ﬁrm as it progresses through its life course.
This study's examination of the relationship between non-founder
human capital and performance is also informed by recent criticism of
the use of single measures such as survival, employment growth, or
sales growth (Miller et al., 2013; Coad et al., 2016a). Indeed, research
on ‘growth’ and ‘survival’ shows that these terms should not be
considered in isolation. For instance, many companies may survive
for years without generating meaningful economic growth (Nightingale
and Coad, 2014; Brown and Mason, 2014). Meanwhile the growing
body of literature discussing entrepreneurial exit explores the multi-
tude of reasons why ﬁrms may shut down for reasons that are not
immediately associated with ‘failure’, such as retirement or the avail-
ability of attractive opportunities for the entrepreneur elsewhere
(Wennberg et al., 2010, 2016; Coad, 2014; DeTienne et al., 2015;
Luzzi and Sasson, 2016). This has been conceptualised in Gimeno et al.
(1997) and DeTienne et al. (2008), who consider entrepreneurs’
thresholds for exit and argue that a range of personal and environ-
mental factors may increase or lower an entrepreneur's willingness to
persist with their business despite poor performance. This paper builds
on this work to consider the role of access to diﬀerent sources of human
capital on ﬁrms' tendency to persist despite low growth, exit despite
high growth, or thrive by continuing through high growth.
A ﬁrm's likelihood to persist, exit or grow is signiﬁcantly informed
by the stage of the life course in which the ﬁrm is observed. The ﬁrm
aging literature (Henderson, 1999; Sorensen and Stuart 2000;
Thornhill and Amit 2003) demonstrates the range of challenges that
ﬁrms face as they progress from new ﬁrms, into ‘adolescence’ (see
Aspelund et al. (2005), Courderoy et al. (2012) on new technology
based ﬁrms, or NTBFs), and on into maturity. As ﬁrms age they face
diﬀerent requirements for human capital, investment (ﬁnancial capital)
and market challenges. These changing demands of the life course have
signiﬁcant implications on entrepreneurs' threshold for exit, as does
entrepreneurs’ ability to access resources such as workforce skills. This
paper sets forth a model linking skills, threshold theory and ﬁrm aging,
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in which it argues that inability to access certain types of human capital
at a particular time in a ﬁrm's life course may have signiﬁcant long-
term consequences on its performance and/or survival. In particular, it
argues that while founders themselves may have suﬃcient human
capital to keep ﬁrms from failing, lack of non-founder managerial
capital in initial phases of the life course lowers these founders’
threshold for acceptable returns required not to exit. Consequently
founders accept suboptimal returns instead of exiting the market.
Conversely, the paper argues that among ﬁrms that have shown higher
growth, lack of speciﬁc managerial capital later in the life course means
that founders may choose to exit rather than continue their successful
businesses.
The paper tests this framework on a unique longitudinal study of
UK high-technology ventures (also sometimes referred to as New
Technology Based Firms or NTBFs), which allows the tracking of ﬁrms
from their early stages through to adolescence and into maturity over a
period of over thirteen years. It uses a performance measure combining
growth and survival that allows for the identiﬁcation of factors
associated with a ﬁrm's persistence, exit or ongoing thriving. The
results suggest that perceived shortfalls in key complementary human
capital have diﬀerent consequences though the life course of the ﬁrms,
with shortfalls in early stages having a long-term eﬀect on ﬁrms’
performance.
Consequently this paper makes three main contributions: ﬁrstly it
demonstrates the importance of workforce human capital to ﬁrm
performance. It shows that access to these forms of human capital is
a prerequisite to growth, and lack of this human capital at key intervals
can have a permanent limiting eﬀect on ﬁrm performance. Second, it
links access to these types of human capital to the entrepreneur's
decision to persist with a low performing ﬁrm or exit. In doing so this
paper argues that inability to access key complementary resources
shifts the entrepreneur's ambitions over time, leading them to accept
poor performance or exit despite good performance. Finally it shows
how the aging process changes the demand for human capital and
shapes the entrepreneur's decision to persist or exit. This study has the
following structure: Section 2 presents the background literature;
Section 3 describes the growth-survival framework; Section 4 discusses
data and method; Section 5 describes the results; Section 6 discusses
the ﬁndings, theoretical implications, policy implications and future
work.
2. Literature review
2.1. Founder and non-founder human capital and ﬁrm performance
Much of the literature relating to human capital in entrepreneurial
ﬁrms has considered ﬁrm performance through the lens of the ‘upper
echelon’ perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; see Carpenter et al.,
2004 for a survey). This view argues that the performance of a ﬁrm
reﬂects the experiences, skills, values and motivations of the founder,
CEO and/or top management team. This view is commonly used both
in the study of larger ﬁrms (for instance Hitt et al., 2001, Lynskey,
2004), as well as entrepreneurial ﬁrms and new technology-based ﬁrms
(NTBFs) (Cooper et al., 1994; Westhead and Cowling, 1995; Brüderl
et al., 1992; Storey and Tether, 1998; Baron et al, 1999; Baron et al,
2001; Colombo and Delmastro, 2001; Aspelund et al., 2005; Colombo
and Grilli, 2005, 2010; Ganotakis, 2012; Visintin and Pittino, 2014).
This proposition is supported by the literature on survival and human
capital, which shows that ﬁrms whose founders have lower levels of
general and speciﬁc human capital are more likely to fail (Cooper et al.,
1994; Ucbasaran et al., 2007). Low levels of founding team human
capital in terms of industry and start-up experience have generally
been associated with lower survival and performance as well (Delmar,
2006; Delmar and Shane, 2004; Huang et al., 2012). These ﬁndings
support the view within the literature using upper echelon theory that
founders’ skills and experience are vital for identiﬁcation of entrepre-
neurial opportunities. (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). In the context of
high tech ventures, founders are more likely to come from a technical
background (Cooper et al., 1994; Westhead and Cowling, 1995; Oakey
2003), which gives them the ability to identify opportunities for new
innovations (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Colombo and Grilli,
2005).
Founders' importance for a ﬁrm's prospects for growth sometimes
overshadows the role of other, non-founder forms of human capital
(Klaas et al., 2010). Human capital within the workforce is also hugely
important and contributes to organizational performance (Wright
et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2005; Collins and Smith, 2006; De Winne
and Sels 2010; Andries and Czarnitzki 2014; Delgado-Verde et al.,
2016; Sommer et al., 2016). Yet in the context of innovative ﬁrms
technical skills are often prioritized at the expense of complementary
managerial skills required to bring products to market (Blaydon et al.,
1999; Paradkar et al., 2015). In order for innovative ﬁrms to capture
value from their innovations, there exists a range of non-technical
human capital required, including general human capital (i.e. general
management, production) or human capital specialized to the speciﬁc
knowledge and context of the ﬁrm (i.e. R &D); (Helfat and Lieberman,
2002). These are particularly important in high-tech ventures, given
that founders are more likely to have a technical background and
therefore need to source these complementary sources of human
capital from the workforce. Recent research by Dahl and Klepper
(2015) on hiring practices of new Danish ﬁrms suggests that employees
are eﬀectively sorted by ability, with higher quality employees being
paid higher salaries by more resource-endowed ﬁrms that have shown
higher growth levels and prospects of survival. This ﬁnding has been
supported by Sommer et al. (2016), who ﬁnd that perceived innova-
tiveness of a ﬁrm makes the ﬁrm more attractive to potential employ-
ees. This study tests one implication of Dahl and Klepper's (2015)
work, which is that ﬁrms that are unable to access key skills in early
stages will be likely to show lower levels of performance and survival
over the long-run.
2.2. Growth ambitions, access to resources and survival
A ﬁrm's survival is predicated on the founder or manager's desire to
continue the business, and consequently this fundamental decision has
been highlighted throughout the literature in a number of ways. This
paper's particular focus relates to how this decision evolves over time.
The selection model of Jovanovic (1982) highlights that low expecta-
tions for ﬁrm performance and higher paying options outside the ﬁrm
will lead ﬁrms to exit. This broad expectation is not necessarily
empirically demonstrated, as there are many ﬁrms that perform poorly
yet remain in operation (Ruhnka et al., 1992; van Witteloostuijn, 1998;
Nightingale and Coad, 2014). Gimeno et al. (1997) explored the
question of why some businesses survive while others with similar
(or superior) resource endowments do not, and ultimately argued that
ﬁrms (and more speciﬁcally entrepreneurs and managers) have a
performance threshold that must be met for the ﬁrm to remain in
business. In particular, entrepreneurs with higher levels of human
capital and opportunities for work in alternate jobs are less likely to
tolerate lower levels of economic performance, whereas entrepreneurs
with lower levels of social capital but higher levels of psychic income
(that is, intangible returns to the job) are likely to tolerate poor
performance and thus survive. More recent work by DeTienne et al.
(2008) builds on those ﬁndings by identifying a number of factors that
lead entrepreneurs to increase their commitment to a venture despite
poor performance, including market opportunities, personal invest-
ment, personal options, previous organizational success and perceived
collective eﬃcacy of the organization.
Key to entrepreneurs' decisions to persist is the growth ambition or
reference point that entrepreneurs have for their business (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Stewart et al., 1999; Westhead et al., 2005).
Entrepreneurs' growth ambitions are shaped by a range of demo-
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graphic, personal and institutional factors (Davidsson, 1989; Kolvereid
1992; Liao and Welsch 2003; Cassar 2006). Importantly the desire to
grow is not the same as the ability grow. Wiklund and Shepherd (2003)
show that while there is a positive relationship between growth
ambitions and manifested growth, the entrepreneur's human capital
(manifested by education and experience) and market dynamism
positively moderate this relationship, suggesting that more educated
and experienced entrepreneurs with higher levels of ambition are more
likely to lead ﬁrms with high levels of growth. Dutta and Thornhill
(2009) explore the role of diﬀerent cognitive styles in shaping growth
intentions over the evolution of a ﬁrm, ﬁnding that these styles inform
an entrepreneur's response to conditions that diﬀer from what had
originally been expected. In these papers and others addressing the
topic (e.g Terjesen and Szerb, 2008; Verheul and van Mil, 2011;
Douglas, 2013), emphasis is placed on cognitive style and individual
human capital, but less emphasis is made on access to key non-founder
human resources, those factors contributing to what DeTienne et al.
(2008) refer to as ‘collective eﬃcacy’. Wennberg et al. (2016) highlight
the importance of age, size and performance on shifting entrepreneurs’
attitudes toward survival and their use of growth as a response to poor
performance. With this said many of these studies, even those that do
have a longitudinal component, do not capture the impact of lack of
resources or link it clearly to the threshold perspective. Speciﬁcally, the
lack of non-founder human capital and its impact on growth is not
clearly addressed, and even more so the impact of these over the life
course of the ﬁrm itself.
2.2.1. Growth and exit over the life course
The factors contributing to exit or failure vary over the ﬁrm's life
course. While in their early years ﬁrms suﬀer from a ‘liability of
newness’ (Stinchcombe, 1965; Bruderl and Schussler 1990) in which
they are particularly prone to failure, as they mature they face diﬀerent
challenges, resulting in a ‘liability of adolescence’, which varies across
industry and strategy (Henderson, 1999). While lack of managerial
knowledge and ﬁnancial management skills are reasons for exit in early
years, once ﬁrms have navigated liabilities of newness and adolescence
they then are liable to failure due to external conditions (Thornhill and
Amit, 2003). As they age, ﬁrms are both more likely to innovate and
also more likely to see those innovations become obsolete (Sorensen
and Stuart, 2000). Consequently there is an increasing impetus for
ﬁrms to continue investing in innovation even as they move into
maturity.
Even as ﬁrms proceed through the life course, ‘mortality’ and
‘survival’ are not necessarily straightforward terms. It is a widespread
but inaccurate caricature that survival is implicitly ‘good’ while closure
is necessarily ‘bad’. The growing literature on exit has recently
emphasized the distinction between voluntary entrepreneurial exit,
closure and failure (see Bates, 2005, Headd, 2003, Wennberg et al.,
2010, Coad, 2014; DeTienne et al., 2015; Khelil, 2016). In the ﬁrst
case, ‘entrepreneurial exit’ refers to those cases where the founder exits
the ﬁrm but the ﬁrm continues trading (Wennberg et al., 2010).
‘Closure’ refers to the voluntary winding-down of a business, which
takes place if an entrepreneur retires and decides to close her business,
or if an entrepreneur chooses to re-enter employment for another
company and closes the ﬁrm (Hessels et al., 2010; Luzzi and Sasson,
2016). Closure itself is not necessarily bad, but represents a conscious
choice to cease trading (Balcaen et al., 2012; Ceﬁs and Marsili, 2011;
Wennberg et al., 2010). Of these, only ‘failure’ (i.e. insolvency,
liquidation or closure in face of the pending recognition of these)
represents involuntary exit subsequent to poor performance. Indeed,
standard economic theory would regard the exit of poorly performing
low quality entrepreneurship as an eﬃcient reallocation of resources
that could be better employed elsewhere.
The interest here is therefore to link the topics discussed above,
speciﬁcally to understand the impact of access to complementary skills
and broader human capital on a ﬁrm's threshold for accepting variable
levels of ﬁrm performance prior to exiting. To fully understand this
these issues however, one needs long-run data to capture the relative
thresholds over performance over an extended period. This paper does
this using a dataset containing ﬁrm performance over thirteen years.
To track persistence it uses a combined measure of growth and survival
that allows the diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent forms of exit and
survival. To the authors' knowledge this approach is unique, seeing as
previous work such as Delmar et al. (2013) and Solomon et al. (2013),
estimated separate regressions while this paper uses a common
measure that combines these approaches.
3. Framework and hypotheses
Growth (i.e. changes in employment or sales over time) and survival
are two of the most common measures of ﬁrm performance. Growth is
a fundamental process of the life course of ﬁrms, and has been widely
studied on its own (Storey, 1994; Coad, 2009; McKelvie and Wiklund,
2010). At the same time, there has been increasing recognition that
growth is not a standard, unitary measure. While employment growth
and sales growth are often used interchangeably on their own as
proxies of growth (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001), these measures are
in fact only weakly correlated (Chandler et al., 2009) and are often
sequential (Coad et al., 2016a. Consequently, research in this area that
focuses on individual measures run this risk of only capturing part of
the picture of ﬁrm performance, rather than a full portrait (Boyd et al.,
2005). Further, as a conceptual tool Miller et al. (2013) argue that
performance is an abstract concept that in much research is not
appropriately used or understood. Consequently, there is a need for
alternate approaches to the consideration of growth.
The discussion of literature provided in the previous section has
similarly highlighted the limitations of binary approaches to survival.
For the analysis a simple framework is introduced to highlight and
contextualize the range of possible outcomes that a ﬁrm might
demonstrate over an extended period. In particular, the framework
highlights the outcomes, rather than processes, of these decisions.
Consequently rather than only considering survival and failure, the
framework also includes the level of growth shown by the ﬁrm in the
time period.
The framework emphasizes the diﬀerences between the four
categories obtained from a 2×2 matrix along the dimensions of high/
low growth vs survival/failure. Although survival/failure is a binary
outcome, thus naturally ﬁtting into a 2×2 matrix framework, never-
theless growth is a continuous variable, and its inclusion in the 2×2
framework comes at the cost of a loss of statistical information
(because a continuous variable is transformed into a binary variable).
This framework, presented in Fig. 1, considers growth and survival
in the following ways:
In order to better explain this framework, the subsequent sections
draw upon existing literature in order to hypothesize about the
characteristics of ﬁrms that will end up in these categories, speciﬁcally
Fig. 1. Schematic of growth and survival.
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focusing on complementary skills. The low-growth/failure category is
considered to be the baseline. Figure 2 summarises the categories and
predicted shortfalls of skills through the life course.
3.1. Background assumptions
Examining long-run performance and exit requires certain back-
ground assumptions. For this examination of survival without growth,
growth followed by exit and growth and survival one must ﬁrst consider
the human capital of the founder. The literature on the importance of
founders for high-tech ventures (e.g. Cooper et al., 1994, Westhead and
Cowling, 1995; Colombo and Grilli, 2005, 2010) has already been
discussed in Section 2, and the aim of the framework is not to
understate the importance of individual human capital but to instead
take this as a given factor to be controlled. Because the data consider
exit after a ﬁrm is at least four years old and has already passed the
period in which the ﬁrm is most likely to fail or entrepreneur is mostly
likely to exit (Evans, 1987; Evans and Leighton 1989), it is fair to
assume that there must be a baseline of capability supporting the ﬁrm's
survival. Consequently, following Lazear's (2004) ‘jack of all trades’
hypothesis, one may propose that in addition to the technical back-
ground of founders that they also have some range of diverse skills
simply to run a business that survives and negotiates the initial
challenges of innovation (Saemundsson, 2005). However while foun-
ders of high-tech ventures may have some degree of complementary
skills, they also often lack the background, training and time to carry
out the range of in-depth duties required for ﬁrms to grow (Blaydon
et al., 1999). Consequently, the framework proposes that access to
these complementary skills and human capital is a factor that informs
the founders’ ability to grow and/or exit.
3.2. Persistence
One possible long-run outcome is a ﬁrm's survival over the long
term but failure to grow, which the framework refers to as persistence.
To explain this the framework draws upon the threshold explanation of
survival discussed above, speciﬁcally the suggestion derived from
Gimeno et al. (1997) and DeTienne et al. (2008) that founders with
lower levels of human capital are more willing to tolerate lower returns.
This may also relate to the presence of non-pecuniary entrepreneurial
objectives such as the desire for independence that implicitly trades oﬀ
income for independence. As discussed above, this immediately poses a
conundrum, as there must be a baseline of capability in the organiza-
tion for ﬁrms to survive for an extended period. Even if the founder has
reasonably diverse levels of personal human capital, in the early stages
of the ﬁrm's growth he or she will also require complementary skills
and human capital, particularly the general management skills identi-
ﬁed in Thornhill and Amit (2003) as vital for navigating the liabilities of
newness. Failure to access these skills may not be suﬃcient for the ﬁrm
to fail, but may be a signiﬁcant barrier to growth, which subsequently
may reduce the founder's threshold for what constitutes acceptable
performance. Following Cassar (2007) and Dutta and Thornhill (2009),
this negative, unexpected variance from the expected trajectory of the
ﬁrm is likely to lower the entrepreneur's growth ambitions.
Consequently one may hypothesize that founders’ perceived lack of
access to these skills in the early periods of the ﬁrm will lower the
growth prospects of the ﬁrm.
H1a. Persistent ﬁrms founders will report general complementary
skills shortfalls in early stages of the life course.
Although these ﬁrms may show a lack of general managerial skills,
the entrepreneur is likely to have a technical background (Cooper et al.,
1994; Westhead and Cowling, 1995; Oakey 2003) and, as discussed
above, a baseline level of capability to keep the ﬁrm from failing in its
ﬁrst ﬁve years. Consequently these ﬁrms are unlikely to report a lack of
speciﬁc complementary skills such as R&D as these would, if nothing
else, be addressed by the entrepreneur's human capital:
H1b. Persistent ﬁrms' founders will not report speciﬁc complementary
skills shortfalls in early stages of the life course.
Having not grown and therefore continuing to rely on the founder's
human capital, the entrepreneur's growth aspirations are therefore
likely to be limited as he/she realizes that the opportunities for exit via
paid employment are likely to result in lower returns than the
entrepreneur makes with his/her ﬁrm (Luzzi and Sasson, 2016).
Consequently with barriers to exit in place and unanticipated diﬃculty
accessing key skills and human capital, the entrepreneur's growth
expectations will be lowered (as discussed above per Dutta and
Thornhill (2009)). The lowered expectations will raise the threshold
to exit per Gimeno et al. (1997) and DeTienne et al. (2008).
Consequently the perceived requirement for complementary general
managerial skills and human capital – otherwise required to grow –
will be diminished:
H1c. Persistent ﬁrms' founders will not report general complementary
skills shortfalls in early stages of the life course.
Meanwhile, as undersized ﬁrms in innovative sectors, these ﬁrms
lack the complementary skills and human capital to facilitate growth
but must continue their innovation activity to survive and remain
competitive (per Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). The high risk proﬁle of
innovative activity for younger ﬁrms means that ﬁrms that are less
successful at innovation are more likely to record lower performance
(Coad et al., 2016b), even while persisting in the marketplace
(Wennberg et al., 2016). For these ﬁrms, this means that the manage-
rial problems, lack of economies of scale in innovative activity
(Nightingale, 2000), and lower growth are likely to lead entrepreneurs
to perceive specialized, technical skills as an issue where before they
did not:
H1d. Persistent ﬁrms' founders will report speciﬁc complementary
skills shortfalls in early stages of the life course.
3.3. Exit
The converse of persistent ﬁrms are those ﬁrms which show higher
levels of growth but cease operating. As discussed in Section 2, there
are a range of reasons why founders of successful ﬁrms may wish to exit
(and also cause their business to cease operations): they may wish to
return to paid employment, retire, or seek lifestyle changes, or exit for
other reasons (Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014; Wennberg et al., 2010).
Indeed, exit and ‘cashing out’ after building a successful company is
one strategy for exit (DeTienne et al., 2015), so exiting may be a
proﬁtable measure. Consequently these ﬁrms that have demonstrated
growth are less likely to have faced barriers in access general or speciﬁc
skills and human capital in their early phases. Following the existing
Report shortfalls of:
Early stage Late stage
Persistence
General skills Yes No
Specific skills No Yes
Exit
General skills No Yes
Specific skills No Yes
Thriving
General skills No No
Specific skills No No
Fig. 2. Summary of hypotheses across the life course.
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literature linking skills and human capital to ﬁrm performance (Smith
et al., 2005; De Winne and Sels, 2010; Andries and Czarnitzki 2014),
ﬁrms that have shown higher performance are also more likely to have
higher (or at least acceptable) skill levels and human capital. Given the
crucial role of general complementary skills and human capital for
growth (Blaydon et al., 1999) ﬁrms that have demonstrated growth in
the initial period may be hypothesized to have had these general skills:
H2a. Exiting ﬁrms' founders will not report general complementary
skills shortfalls in early stages of the life course.
Similarly to the argument in Section 3.2 given the human capital of
the founders and their likely technical proﬁciency (Westhead and
Cowling, 1995; Oakey 2003; Colombo and Grilli 2005), as well as the
evidence of growth as discussed above, this may be similarly extended:
H2b. Exiting ﬁrms' founders will not report speciﬁc complementary
skills shortfalls in early stages of the life course.
As discussed above, founders' threshold regarding cost of exit shifts
as ﬁrms mature. The liabilities of adolescence (Henderson, 1999) and
beyond (Thornhill and Amit, 2003) mean that the demands faced by
ﬁrms over time change dramatically, as the necessity of innovation and
risk of obsolescence requires ongoing investment in new technology
and training. This is particularly true for ﬁrms that have demonstrated
growth over their history, and there is a wide perception (with mixed
empirical support) that the skills required to found a company diﬀer
from those required to scale up growth, necessitating a change in
management (see the review in Pollock et al. (2009)). The threshold
perspective (Gimeno et al., 1997; DeTienne et al., 2008) suggests that
higher levels of human capital lowers the barriers to exit. However, the
challenges of ongoing investment, the loss of key staﬀ (Baron et al.,
2001) and the changing market create a scenario in which a founder,
reﬂecting on past success but facing future challenges, may choose to
exit or close the company, particularly if returns to returning to
employment are likely to be high (Luzzi and Sasson, 2016).
Wennberg et al. (2016) suggest that founders will face the choice to
grow the ﬁrm or close, and that the preference is to growth the ﬁrm
rather than terminate the business. However in considering those ﬁrms
that have stopped trading, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that
these founders face diﬃculty in accessing the general or speciﬁc skills
required for ongoing investment in the ﬁrm's innovative activity or
growth, they may be willing to consider exiting the ﬁrm, even despite
the ﬁrm's success thus far:
H2c. Exiting ﬁrms' founders will report shortfalls of general
complementary skills later in the life course.
H2d. Exiting ﬁrms' founders will report shortfalls of technical
complementary skills later in the life course.
3.4. Thriving
Finally this framework considers those ﬁrms that have survived and
shown long-run growth, which are here referred to as ‘thriving’ ﬁrms.
For these ﬁrms one may set out the converse to the arguments above
regarding access to skills and human capital. The framework has
previously hypothesized that access to suﬃcient skills and human
capital in the early stages will enable a ﬁrm to achieve higher growth,
drawing upon literature linking skills and human capital to perfor-
mance (e.g. Smith et al., 2005). Given the previous suggestion that the
founder's technical background (Westhead and Cowling, 1995; Oakey
2003; Colombo and Grilli 2005) is likely to provide a baseline suﬃcient
for achieving initial growth, the initial argument from Section 3.3 may
be extended:
H3a. Thriving ﬁrms' founders will not report general complementary
skills shortfalls in early stages of the life course.
H3b. Thriving ﬁrms' founders will not report speciﬁc complementary
skills shortfalls in early stages of the life course.
The challenges facing ﬁrms as they mature (e.g. Thornhill and Amit,
2003) has already been discussed, with the suggestions that prior
access to human capital lowers founders’ threshold to exit (per Gimeno
et al., 1997 and DeTienne et al., 2008). As mapped out in Section 3.3
there are a series of challenges facing ﬁrms that have grown success-
fully in the past. Even if they face diﬃcult times, the response to those
challenges may be to grow (Wennberg et al., 2016). While some
founders might choose to exit rather than invest in the required
additional capacity if they face skills shortfalls in technical areas, those
that do not face these shortfalls may feel less inclined to exit, and may,
therefore, choose to persist with their business. These ﬁrms may not
face shortfalls due to managerial competence, investment in HR, luck
or other reasons but one may logically extend this ﬁnding to suggest
that those ﬁrms that do not report shortfalls later in the life course will
be more likely to survive and grow over the long-run.
H3c. Thriving ﬁrms' founders will not report general complementary
skills shortfalls in later stages of the life course.
H3d. Thriving ﬁrms' founders will not report speciﬁc complementary
skills shortfalls in later stages of the life course.
4. Data and method
The analysis uses a unique longitudinal dataset following 202 high-
tech UK ﬁrms over the past twenty years. The dataset is based on two
surveys that were carried out in 1997 and again in 2003. Managers in
these companies were asked about a range of issues including access to
skills and human capital, technology strategy, internationalization,
ﬁnance and a number of other topics. The ﬁrst wave of the survey in
1997 captured a group of ﬁrms that were at that time on average ﬁve
years old. The deﬁnition of ‘high technology’ reﬂected the Butchart
(1987) deﬁnition for high technology manufacturing sectors, which
may be roughly translated to include ﬁrms in electronics, software,
advanced materials, telecommunications and biotechnology sectors.
Firms were selected from a panel of all ﬁrms with more than three
employees operating in these sectors that had been founded between
1987 and 1996. Firms were contacted in late 1997 and early 1998 via a
written questionnaire, yielding 362 completed questionnaires. This
survey was then followed up with another wave run in 2002 and 2003
in which the same ﬁrms were contacted again, yielding 217 completed
questionnaires from the same sample, resulting in a panel of 217 ﬁrms.
Both waves of the survey asked founders about their current position,
access to human capital, innovation activities, strategy and other
topics.
This paper focuses on the long-term performance implications of
conﬁgurations of human capital, necessitating a further record of ﬁrm
performance subsequent to the 2003 survey. These data discussed
above were therefore augmented with performance data drawn from
the Business Structure Database (BSD) of the UK Oﬃce of National
Statistics. The BSD is the most comprehensive record of ﬁrm perfor-
mance data in the UK, representing a complete dataset of nearly all
ﬁrms in the UK economy, with employment data drawn from National
Insurance and turnover data derived from value-added tax records
from HM Treasury. The BSD was used to create a panel of the
performance of ﬁrms in the survey from 1997 to 2010. As is common
in these exercises, a small number of ﬁrms were unable to be matched,
resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 202 ﬁrms. Checks found no evidence that
the unmatched ﬁrms were more or less likely to come from any
particular sector, size bracket or other key area.The combination of
dependent variables from oﬃcial sources with survey data, as well as
the temporal separation of the waves by 6–7 years is a good way of
reducing risk of common method bias (Podsakoﬀ et al., 2003).
4.1. Variables and framework
As presented above, the key 2×2 framework discussed above
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combines measures of growth and survival. The schematic has survival
(a binary variable, as ﬁrms are either coded as being active or not) on
the y-axis, and growth on the x-axis; growth is divided into two
categories for growth, with ﬁrms separated based on whether their
employment growth over the period 1997–2010 was above or below
the mean of the log growth in employment. The ‘active’/‘inactive’ and
‘high’/‘low’ growth axes allow the generation of a 2×2 matrix of
performance. This presents with four categories: ‘Failure’ (low perfor-
mance, inactive: the ﬁrm performed poorly and has now ceased to
operate); ‘Persistence’ (low performance, active: the ﬁrm has per-
formed poorly but has remained active to 2010); ‘Exit’ (high perfor-
mance, inactive: the ﬁrm grew but is no longer operational; this may
include ﬁrms that have been intentionally wound-down by owners);
and ‘Survival’ (high performance, active: ﬁrms that have demonstrated
growth and general success). Approximately half the ﬁrms fall into the
‘Survival’ category, with one-quarter in the ‘Persistence’ category and
approximately 12% each fall in the ‘Failure’ and ‘Exit’ categories.
4.1.1. Variables
A number of forms of human capital were captured in the data.
Workforce human capital is measured using a series of questions that
asked the founder about whether the ﬁrm had suﬀered from a shortfall
of managerial skills (short_mgmt_97 and short_mgmt_03); ﬁnancial
skills (short_ﬁnance_97 and short_ﬁnance_03); sales skills (short_-
sales_97 and short_sales_03); marketing skills (short_marketing_97
and short_marketing_03), and R &D skills (short_research_97 and
short_research_03). In line with the previous discussion of interest in
general management skills, management, sales, ﬁnance and marketing
skills are classiﬁed as general skills and R&D is classiﬁed as a speciﬁc
skill. Importantly, these measures only capture the founders' percep-
tion of a shortfall, rather than an absolute measure of individuals/skills
working in a given area. This approach captures perceptions that might
contribute to shifts in founders' threshold for exit.
A number of controls are used to measure entrepreneurs' human
capital, including size of the founding team (nbr_founders), previous
experience working together (founder_joint), previous entrepreneurial
experience (exp_ent) and a number of questions capturing the range of
founders’ international experiences: experience living abroad (ex-
p_abr), experience working abroad (exp_intl_work), and education
abroad (edu_abroad). Controls for innovative activity include the
percentage of staﬀ classed as skilled (skilled staﬀ_pct), the percentage
of staﬀ engaged in R&D activities (rd_employees) and percentage of
turnover spent on R &D (rd_turnover). Controls for access to capital
include venture capital (vc_97 and vc_03) or angel (angel_97 and
angel_03) investment, as well as whether the companies had received
public grants (grant_97 and grant_03). Additional controls include
sector dummies and a measure of ﬁrm size at founding.
4.2. Method
Because the aim of the research is the understanding of the relative
probability of a ﬁrm being in one of four categories, the most
appropriate technique is the multinomial logit model. This approach
is preferable as it allows the estimation of both measures at the same
time rather than separately as growth and survival.
Multinomial logit models are based on similar principles to tradi-
tional binary logit models, but allow calculation of the relative
probability not of one event taking place, but of several compared to
a reference outcome category. They do this by operating the equivalent
of a number of binary models linked together, but in order to generate
a coeﬃcient β for the complete equation, an additional β term is
required (Greene, 2003); consequently a ‘base’ value for the equation
must be speciﬁed. The speciﬁcation presented here uses the category
‘failure’ as the base, allowing the calculation of results from other
categories ‘Persistent’, ‘Exit’ and ‘Thriving’. For our analysis we use
probability weighting, following the weights discussed in Burgel et al
(2004). As a robustness check the multinomial logit model was run
using each of the four categories as a base, and traditional logit models
for each category were also estimated, without signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
results. These are not included here but are available from the authors
upon request.
5. Results
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2. These show
the means of the main variables as well as a breakdown of ﬁrm size by
sector at founding, in 1997 and in 2003. The descriptive statistics
highlight the skewed distributions but more broadly highlight the
relative persistence of size in the ﬁrms in question, with median ﬁrm
size remaining approximately 15 between 1997 and 2003. This shows
that despite the growth for many of the ﬁrms, the overall ﬁrm size, on
average, remained fairly small.
The results of the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 3.
In examining the ﬁrms classed as persistent, the estimations show that
early in the life course the founders were more likely to report shortfalls
of marketing but not of the other general skills, leaving H1a partially
supported. Firms did not report shortfalls of speciﬁc skills, supporting
H1b. As these ﬁrms age, they were not more likely to report shortfalls
in general skills, but were more likely to report shortfalls in R &D,
supporting both H1c and H1d.
The results for those ﬁrms that exit show no evidence that these
ﬁrms were more likely to report general or speciﬁc skills shortfalls early
in their life, therefore supporting H2a and H2b. For exiting ﬁrms
shortfalls of ﬁnance skills are associated with exit, but none of the other
general managerial skills were associated with exit, therefore only
Table 1
List of variables.
Variable name Description (* binary) Mean Std Dev
nbr_founders Number of founders 2.227 1.390
new_entr New entrepreneur* 0.831 0.375
work_abroad Work experience abroad* 0.439 0.497
work_mnc Work for international firm* 0.455 0.498
edu_abroad Education abroad* 0.145 0.352
founder_joint Founder joint experience* 0.529 0.500
prev_entrepreneur Experienced entrepreneur* 0.623 0.485
skilled_staﬀ_pct Percentage high skill employees
1997
35.587 30.544
rd_turnover Percentage turnover spent on R
&D 1997
6.564 10.476
rd_employees Number of R &D employees
1997
4.244 9.638
rd_intensity R&D intensity (percentage R &
D employees of total
employment)
23.418 23.914
Reported skills
shortfalls:
marketing_97 Shortage marketing skills 1997* 0.404 0.491
marketing_03 Shortage marketing skills 2003* 0.253 0.435
sales_97 Shortage sales skills 1997* 0.397 0.490
sales_03 Shortage sales skills 2003* 0.283 0.451
ﬁnance_97 Shortage finance skills 2003* 0.325 0.469
ﬁnance_03 Shortage finance skills 2003* 0.185 0.389
research_97 Shortage R &D skills 2003* 0.291 0.455
research_03 Shortage R &D skills 2003* 0.404 0.491
vc_97 Received VC in 1997* 0.082 0.275
vc_03 Received VC in between 1997
and 2003*
0.103 0.304
angel_97 Received angel investment in
1997*
0.162 0.368
angel_03 Received angel investment
between 1997 and 2003*
0.180 0.385
grant_97 Received grant in 1997* 0.199 0.399
grant_03 Received between 1997 and
2003*
0.214 0.410
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partially supporting H2c. However there were shortfalls in R &D skills,
supporting hypothesis H2d.
The results for ﬁrms that have thrived, show that, as hypothesized,
these ﬁrms are less likely to have reported shortfalls early in their life
course, therefore supporting hypotheses H3A and H3B; or later in the
life course, supporting H3C and H3D. Consequently most of the
hypotheses may be concluded to be broadly supported.
6. Discussion
6.1. Summary
There is a well-developed literature on the role of human capital on
the performance of new technology based ﬁrms (Westhead and
Cowling, 1995;Aspelund et al., 2005; Colombo and Grilli 2005, 2010;
Brinckmann et al., 2011; Ganotakis, 2012). This longitudinal study of
245 UK high-tech ventures contributes to this literature in three
diﬀerent ways. First, this paper discusses the importance of workforce
skills, rather than the human capital of the founder or top management
team, as is commonly done in the literature. Second, it considers two
measures of performance (growth and survival) jointly rather than
simply one measure or the other. Third, it examines the changing
impact of workforce skills on the ﬁrm's performance over an extended
period, therefore allowing the tracking of changes as ﬁrms progress
through their life course.
Following recent but diﬀuse literature emphasizing the role of
workforce skills and human capital for ﬁrm performance (Smith et al.,
2005; Collins and Smith, 2006; De Winne and Sels 2010; Andries and
Czarnitzki 2014), the paper hypothesizes that access to quality general
and speciﬁc human capital skills in the workforce is also crucial to a
ﬁrm's long-term success. The study ﬁnds that the absence of general
skills (particularly marketing skills) in the early years of a ﬁrm has a
long-term impact on the ﬁrm's success, even when the founder has
suﬃcient human capital. The ﬁndings suggest that diﬃculty in acces-
sing skills can be a signiﬁcant barrier to ﬁrm growth and survival. The
demonstration of the make-or-break importance of a range of work-
force skills (as opposed to the skills of the founder or top management
team) for ﬁrm performance makes this study an important contribu-
Table 2
Descriptive statistics by industry.
Sector IT/Software IT/Hardware Engineering Biomedical Other High-tech Total
Age at ﬁrst observation (mean) 6.65 6.35 7.25 7.18 6.78 6.76
Age at ﬁrst observation (median) 7 6 8 7 6 7
Employment at birth (mean) 4.89 3.12 3.37 4.85 5.2 4.35
Employment at birth (median) 3 3 2 3 3 3
Employment 1997 (mean) 23.48 20.19 13.48 20.82 19.63 20.01
Employment 1997 (median) 15 11 10 9 15 12
Employment 2003 (mean) 27.11 19.59 123.35 31.72 25.62 46.78
Employment 2003 (median) 12 18 14 18 15 15
Sample size 45 24 44 18 71 202
Table 3
Multinomial logit regression for long-run performance 1997–2010 (using failure as the baseline). (* indicates significance at the 0.1 level; ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level; ***
indicates significance at 0.01 level)
Persistence Exit Thriving
RRR Std Err P > z RRR Std Err P > z RRR Std Err P > z
nbr_founders 0.323*** 0.071 0.000 1.200* 0.126 0.082 1.034 0.103 0.736
work_abroad 0.598 0.213 0.149 0.812 0.247 0.493 1.152 0.313 0.603
work_mnc 0.745 0.237 0.355 2.378*** 0.636 0.001 1.803*** 0.398 0.007
edu_abroad 0.101*** 0.053 0.000 0.766 0.231 0.377 0.483*** 0.132 0.008
skilled_staﬀ_pct 0.988** 0.005 0.016 1.000 0.004 0.929 0.997 0.004 0.475
Skills shortages:
marketing_97 3.332*** 1.138 0.000 1.311 0.401 0.376 1.273 0.361 0.394
marketing_03 0.785 0.272 0.486 1.355 0.402 0.306 0.840 0.230 0.525
sales_97 0.600 0.209 0.143 1.507 0.459 0.178 1.462 0.409 0.175
sales_03 1.265 0.395 0.451 0.953 0.251 0.856 1.050 0.243 0.833
ﬁnance_97 0.516** 0.157 0.030 0.769 0.184 0.272 1.106 0.235 0.635
ﬁnance_03 0.693 0.246 0.302 0.508** 0.162 0.034 0.745 0.212 0.300
research_97 0.933 0.247 0.793 0.697 0.006 0.144 0.720 0.154 0.125
research_03 2.484*** 0.694 0.001 1.722** 0.436 0.032 0.818 0.189 0.385
founder_joint 0.979 0.309 0.945 0.989 0.239 0.963 0.528*** 0.113 0.003
prev_entrepreneur 1.004 0.459 0.994 0.207*** 0.083 0.000 0.428** 0.149 0.015
tech_skills 1.066 0.048 0.156 1.025 0.045 0.574 1.099** 0.043 0.015
rd_intensity 1.037*** 0.006 0.000 1.035*** 0.005 0.000 1.024*** 0.005 0.000
vc_97 8.332*** 4.297 0.000 5.093*** 2.260 0.000 1.383 0.612 0.464
vc_03 0.787 0.405 0.642 0.805 0.321 0.588 0.779 0.295 0.511
angel_97 0.086*** 0.054 0.000 0.566 0.228 0.158 0.078*** 0.033 0.000
angel_03 6.797*** 3.593 0.000 1.764 0.757 0.185 3.073*** 1.256 0.006
grant_97 0.465** 0.180 0.048 1.012 0.261 0.963 0.717 0.170 0.159
grant_03 1.514 0.498 0.207 0.836 0.247 0.544 1.098 0.276 0.709
Log likelihood −1693.5071
Number of obs 1624
LR chi2(69) 639.79
Pseudo R2 0.1589
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tion both the literature on high-tech ventures but the entrepreneurship
literature more widely.
The study's second contribution is that it takes into account two
diﬀerent performance measures to understand the importance of
workforce skills and human capital. The study proposes a measure
that combines growth and survival, which facilitates a clear addition to
the literature on the thresholds at which entrepreneurs may exit their
ﬁrms (e.g. Gimeno et al., 1997, DeTienne et al., 2008). The study shows
that access to workforce skills and human capital plays a role in ﬁrms
that are persistent (surviving but showing low growth), that exit despite
showing high growth, and that thrive by surviving and growing. Lack of
access to these skills early in a ﬁrm's life course appears to play a role in
the lowering of entrepreneurs’ expectations for growth and acceptance
of poorer returns. Similarly lack of access to skills later on after periods
of growth appears to be associated with the decision to exit despite high
levels of growth. In this way, demonstrating the impact of access to
workforce skills on growth aspirations and exit decisions makes an
important contribution to the literature by extending the previous
literature on persistence and thresholds to exit.
The importance of the ﬁndings above are magniﬁed by the third
contribution, which relates to the time scale of the study. The long-
itudinal data allows the capture the impact of access to workforce skills
and human capital on persistence and exit over a much longer period
than is typically seen in the literature, covering a period of nearly
twenty years. In this way this paper links the threshold and exit
literature to the literature on ﬁrms' growth challenges throughout the
life course (e.g. Sorensen and Stuart, 2000; Thornhill and Amit, 2003)
to present a uniﬁed framework of the impact of access to complemen-
tary human capital on the long-run performance and persistence of
ﬁrms. The paper's ﬁndings show that access to diﬀerent types of skills
play vital roles at diﬀerent parts of the life course; in earlier parts of the
life course, access to general management skills is crucial, and in the
absence of these skills the growth prospects of these ﬁrms is perma-
nently limited. In contrast, among ﬁrms that have previously grown,
inability to access specialized resources to support continued innova-
tion and growth later in the life course is associated with exit despite
high performance. This makes a key contribution to the literature by
linking these heretofore disparate literatures into a uniﬁed framework.
6.2. Theoretical implications
This paper presents a counterpoint to the widely used ‘upper
echelon’ perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) in management by
arguing for the vital importance of workforce skills and human capital
for long-run ﬁrm performance. While existing literature demonstrates
the importance of founders and top management teams, this study sets
out the beginnings of a theoretical perspective that considers the
impact of the other echelons, that is, the workforce and its comple-
mentary skills, on ﬁrm performance. The ﬁndings support and extend
the threshold theory literature (Gimeno et al., 1997; DeTienne et al.,
2008) by demonstrating that access to these human resources shapes
the life prospects of the ﬁrm. Whereas other studies consider relative
stocks of human capital, this particular study examines the presence or
absence of particular skills to demonstrate the presence of these skills
as a precondition for successful growth, and track the evolution of these
preconditions over time. This supports the ﬁrm aging literature
(Sorensen and Stuart, 2000, Thornhill and Amit, 2003) but extends it
by validating previous ﬁndings over the course of a single long-run
study and emphasizing the importance of resource access to ﬁrms’
persistence. In this way this study integrate three literatures into a
single framework that places access to resources as the basis for
sustainable growth.
6.3. Managerial and policy implications
This study's ﬁndings have a number of implications for managers
and policymakers. They emphasizes the role of general and speciﬁc
workforce skills as preconditions for long-run performance, but the
diﬀerent skills used for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms through the life course is
instructive. For new ﬁrms, the evidence found here clearly points to the
dividends associated with the accumulation of a broad base of skills in
early years. In the absence of particular skills in early years –
particularly marketing – ﬁrms struggle to grow, which has long-lasting
eﬀects on the growth ambitions of the ﬁrm. Consequently the ﬁndings
here advise managers to invest in building a broad skills base among
the workforce, particularly for general managerial functions, from the
early days of the ﬁrm as this appears to at least decrease the chances of
getting into the ‘rut’ of being a marginal, undersized, poor-performing
enterprise (per Nightingale and Coad, 2014). From a policy perspec-
tive, these ﬁndings suggest that the government may have a role in
inﬂuencing young ﬁrms to accumulate skills, particularly general
managerial skills.
However, as ﬁrms age, the recommendations change. In line with
the study's ﬁndings on growth diﬀerent capabilities become important,
and here innovation incentives become more valuable than they would
be for newer ﬁrms. For managers who have struggled with growth
previously the challenge of assembling necessary resources remains.
For those that have done well the challenge becomes the continued
investment in innovation. For policymakers this study's ﬁndings
suggest that mature, low-growth ﬁrms may not have suﬃcient motiva-
tion or capability to seek rapid growth, while for higher-growth ﬁrms
entrepreneurs should be incentivized to invest in innovation and not
exit. These conclusions mirror those in recent work by Antolín-López
et al. (2015) on eﬀective policies for technology-based ﬁrms over the
life course. However, more starkly for policymakers, another ﬁnding is
the importance of time, and the persistence of resource constraints.
The study's ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms that were constrained by access
to skills in the mid-1990s underperformed compared to companies that
were not similarly constrained, even ﬁfteen years later. Consequently,
the decisions that are made in terms of policy supports have a longer
impact than might normally be captured in evaluations. This makes the
importance of addressing resource constraints even more prominent.
6.4. Limitations and future research
This research does have some weaknesses. While the data used here
captures detailed observations in 1997 and 2003, the data do not
capture other subsequent factors that might have contributed to ﬁrms'
eventual performance. The dataset includes ﬁrms that were on average
ﬁve years old at time of observation, meaning that while the sample
selection was random at the time, there was an element of self-selection
in terms of ﬁrms that had survived to this point. Also, the measure of
skills is based on the founder's perception, which suits the speciﬁc
research question but is not an objective measure. Further, there are a
number of other factors not captured here that might impact on
performance, including macro-environmental shocks, competition
and changes in regulation.
There are a number of areas for future research that naturally come
out of the study. While this study focuses on complementary skills,
there are opportunities for use of multilevel human capital frameworks
to explore the role of human capital for innovation and ﬁrm perfor-
mance. The measures used here only captured the ability of ﬁrms to
access these skills, facilitating the suggest they might be a precondition
for growth but not identifying the magnitude of impact. Consequently
more ﬁne-grained measures of skills based on counts of employees or
qualiﬁcations could clarify whether the eﬀect identiﬁed here is simply a
precondition, or whether the magnitude or quality of skills used then
plays a diﬀerent eﬀect on ﬁrm performance. One ﬁnal area for further
exploration would be the use of fuzzy-set analysis to identify ideal
conﬁgurations of skills associated with high levels of performance. In
this way this study points to a number of interesting frontiers for
exploring the factors contributing to ﬁrm performance across the life
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course.
7. Conclusion
This study investigates the impact of access to non-founder human
capital on ﬁrms’ long-run growth and survival. While there has been
extensive research on the impact of founders’ human capital on ﬁrm
performance, there has been considerably less research on the impact
of non-founder skills and resources on ﬁrm performance. The paper
proposes a framework for considering the relationship between growth
and survival, hypothesizing a link between access to skills and
entrepreneurs’ threshold to exit (Gimeno et al., 1997; DeTienne
et al., 2008). Results from analysis of 245 UK new technology-based
ﬁrms over nearly twenty years show that ﬁrms that lack access to
managerial skills early in the life course lowers entrepreneurs' expecta-
tions of growth, while lack of access to specialized skills later in the life
course is associated with the decision to exit despite previous high
growth.
There are a number of practical and theoretical implications of this
study, as discussed in the previous section. In particular one of the
most important contributions is presenting a counterpoint to the
dominant ‘upper echelon’ perspective of human capital (Hambrick
and Mason, 1984) by emphasizing workforce skills as a prerequisite for
long-run growth and survival, regardless of the human capital of the
founder. One implication of this is that the long-running emphasis on
founders and senior management teams in entrepreneurship and
innovation management research needs to be counterbalanced by an
understanding from both managers and policymakers of the vital
importance of workforce human capital as a contributor to long-run
ﬁrm growth and survival. Consequently this paper points to the need
for further research to explore the contribution of workforce human
capital to ﬁrm performance.
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